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Egan v. Chambers, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 25 (Apr. 25, 2013)1
PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
Summary
The Court reexamined whether NRS 41A.071's affidavit-of-merit requirement applies to
claims for professional negligence, which it had answered only a few years ago in Fierle v.
Perez.2
Disposition/Outcome
The plain and unambiguous language of NRS 41A.071 indicates that professional
negligence actions are not subject to its affidavit-of-merit requirement, which applies only to
medical or dental malpractice actions.
Factual and Procedural History
In 2007, respondent Gary Chambers, a doctor of podiatric medicine who was employed
by respondent Southwest Medical Associates (SMA), Inc., performed several surgical
procedures on appellant Tammy Egan’s left foot. After complaints by Egan and several followup visits, Chambers discovered gangrene in Egan’s foot and referred her to another podiatrist,
who performed three other surgeries, including the amputation of her left great toe and part of
her left foot. Following the procedures, the podiatrist concluded that she would be permanently
disabled and unable to return to her job as a waitress.
In July 2008, Egan filed a district court complaint for professional negligence against
Chambers and SMA. Because podiatrists are not considered "physicians" under NRS Chapter
41A for medical malpractice claim purposes, Egan filed the complaint without a supporting NRS
41A.071 affidavit of merit. While Egan's case was pending before the district court, this court
issued its decision in Fierle concluding that an affidavit of merit is required under NRS 41A.071
for both medical malpractice and professional negligence complaints, including when such
claims are asserted against a professional medical corporation. Relying on Fierle, Chambers and
SMA moved to dismiss Egan's complaint in February 2010. The district court granted the motion
and dismissed Egan's complaint without prejudice in July 2010. At that point, Egan was unable
to file a new complaint because the statute of limitations for her claims had expired.
Discussion
Justice Cherry wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court sitting en banc.
When a statute is clear on its face, the Court will not look beyond the statute's plain
language.3 NRS 41A.071 provides that the district court shall dismiss, without prejudice, actions
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for "medical malpractice or dental malpractice" filed without an affidavit of merit.4 The plain
language of NRS 41A.071 makes no mention of professional negligence. NRS 41A.071 refers
expressly to "medical malpractice," which in turn is defined as pertaining to physicians,
hospitals, and hospital employees.5 "Physician" is defined as a person licensed under NRS
Chapters 630 or 633.6 Podiatrists are not licensed pursuant to NRS Chapters 630 or 633; rather,
they are licensed pursuant to NRS Chapter 635.7 Thus, NRS 41A.071 does not, by its plain
terms, apply to Egan's claims against her podiatrist.8
The Court stated that while stare decisis plays a critical role in its jurisprudence,9 its
reading of NRS 41A.071 reveals no statutory ambiguity as previously suggested in Fierle. The
Court recognized that its prior decision conflated "medical malpractice" with "professional
negligence" when it read NRS 41A.071 to apply to all professional negligence claims. To the
Court, applying Fierle to professional negligence claims would be substantially inequitable and
contrary to the plain language of the statute, and so it overruled, in part, its holding in that case
and clarified that NRS 41A.071 only applies to medical malpractice or dental malpractice
actions, not professional negligence actions.10 Therefore, the Court ruled that Egan's professional
negligence action against Chambers and SMA must proceed on the merits.
Conclusion
Under the plain language of NRS 41A.071, professional negligence actions are not
subject to the statute’s affidavit-of-merit requirement. To the extent that the decision in Fierle
conflicts with this holding, it is overruled.
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